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Chapter 8 
Declan Fahy 
A limited focus? Journalism, politics and the Celtic Tiger  
 
Journalists dominated the 2009 end-of-year bestseller lists with books castigating 
Ireland’s financial and political elites for causing the financial crisis that would 
eventually claim the country’s economic sovereignty. In The Bankers Shane Ross 
criticised bank executives and regulators for their close relationship that facilitated years 
of reckless property speculation, while in Who really runs Ireland? Matt Cooper laid out 
the elite nexus of bankers, developers, politicians and media owners that he argued 
allowed a thriving economy to overheat. In Ship of Fools, Fintan O’Toole traced the 
entwined Irish histories of economic mismanagement, political corruption and financial 
fraud that combined so disastrously in the crisis. In Follow the Money, David 
McWilliams described a panicked Irish government amid the 2008 global financial 
meltdown, as then finance minister Brian Lenihan, eating garlic to stay awake, paid a 
late-night visit to the columnist’s house for advice. In Anglo Republic, Simon Carswell 
forensically examined the succession of high-risk financial decisions by Anglo Irish Bank 
executives that forced the government to guarantee bank debts and deposits.  These books 
unflinchingly laid out the national systemic political and financial failure that found apt 
symbolism, among international media, in the half-finished ‘ghost estates’ that littered 
the Irish countryside. 
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These post-crash books were cutting and critical. But such comprehensive analyses, 
commentators noted, were mostly absent during the boom years, from the mid-1990s to 
the mid-2000s, when Ireland’s economy expanded with unprecedented growth. Conor 
Brady, a former editor of the Irish Times, wrote that the country’s journalists had failed in 
their fundamental duty to act as watchdogs over political and financial elites. ‘Was the 
forming of this crisis reportable earlier? Were emerging trends apparent? Did they [the 
news media] do as good a job as they might have in flagging the approaching storm?’ 
asked Brady (2010). He concluded that the criticisms of systemic problems in the Irish 
financial system were not reported ‘in a form that was sufficiently sustained, coherent 
and authoritative.’ In a similar vein, an examination of the coverage of the crisis in the 
Irish and British press found that reporters deserved an ‘F for probing and predicting’ 
(Marron, 2010, 274). Such critical sentiment was summarised in the conclusion to a study 
on the pre-crash performance of UK financial reporters: ‘The financial media . . . did not 
warn us’ of the impending economic turmoil (Manning, 2013, 187).  
 
But such criticism overlooked the fact that there were repeated warnings from some 
journalists, economists and news organisations. McWilliams was one media figure who 
argued consistently that the property bubble would burst. George Lee, then economics 
editor of the state broadcaster RTÉ, was another who sounded cautionary notes. The 
Economist predicted in 2003 that Irish house prices would plummet in the subsequent 
four years as part of a worldwide property crash. In 2005 The New York Times observed 
that regulation was perceived to be so lax in Ireland that ‘Dublin has become known in 
the insurance industry as something of the Wild West of European finance’ (Lavery and 
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O’Brien, 2005). From 2006 onwards, University College Dublin economist Morgan 
O’Kelly wrote a series of op-ed articles warning that the property market would collapse. 
The 2007 RTÉ television programme ‘Future Shock: Property Crash’, presented by 
business journalist Richard Curran, detailed the excesses of the property bubble and 
asked whether or not financial institutions behaved responsibly towards borrowers. But as 
Carswell (2011, 72) noted, these few voices were ignored: for example, Bank of Ireland’s 
chief economist Dan McLaughlin, stated that The Economist article was based on 
‘specious’ arguments.  
 
These examples demonstrate that some journalists did warn citizens of the impending 
international financial catastrophe, but these voices were marginalised and were not given 
the appropriate sustained prominence in coverage that, in retrospect, they warranted. 
Against this background, this chapter offers a more fully developed explanation for the 
lack of a systemic and sustained critical financial journalism during the economic boom. 
It synthesises published accounts of modern financial journalism in Ireland and 
internationally and in-depth interviews with Irish financial journalists to offer an insight 
into the production of financial news, a complex process influenced by the choices of 
individual journalists, their professional routines, the organisations for which business 
reporters work, and the political and legal contexts within which financial journalists 
operate. The eight interviewees were sampled to ensure variability in the type of media 
organisation (print, broadcast, wire service), the length of financial journalism 
experience, and the position in the editorial hierarchy. They were granted requested 
anonymity as they were frequently critiquing their peers and employers, and the views 
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expressed were their personal opinions rather than those of their news organisations. The 
journalists were overwhelmingly experienced: six of the reporters had been reporting on 
financial matters for between five and ten years, one for between one and five years, and 
one for more than ten years (see Fahy, O’Brien and Poti, 2010). 
 
The chapter argues that certain features of this journalistic specialism – undertaken in the 
particular Irish political, economic and media culture – prevented the sustained systemic 
analysis that could have better anticipated the financial crisis. It examines how, amid the 
climate of rampant consumerism and auction politics – where candidates and parties 
compete to make financially attractive promises to voters – caused by the building boom, 
those who questioned the received wisdom that this time it was different were 
marginalised not just by the particular features of financial journalism but also by 
politicians and interest groups that benefited from the boom. It recognises also that media 
outlets themselves are financial entities that are not necessarily detached observers of, or 
immune to, economic booms and busts. The chapter concludes by arguing that the global 
financial crisis, coupled with seismic changes in journalism and political communication, 
has created novel opportunities and methods for systemic coverage of business and 
finance. These styles of financial journalism could broaden the range of journalism in 
Ireland, which has, as Cawley (2011, 600) has noted,  traditionally been ‘more 
comfortable reporting events than explaining processes’ a characteristic that meant the 
media in general missed vital connections that would have helped predict the crash. 
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The historical tensions of Irish financial journalism 
Specialist Irish financial journalists were not appointed until the 1960s. Before that 
decade, even though there was coverage of economic topics such as taxation and 
government budgets, financial reporting was largely limited to lists of share prices on the 
Dublin and London stock exchanges and reports of companies’ annual general meetings. 
The rapid economic development that followed the switch to free trade in the early 1960s 
meant newspapers covered finance in more detail. Nicholas Leonard became the Irish 
Times’ first financial editor in 1963, but he recalled that company editors did not 
welcome his appointment. Leonard (2006, 57) recalled:  
 
. . . in 1963 it was quite commonplace for substantial companies, like John 
Power, the distillers, and Thomas Dockrell, the builders’ providers, to ban 
reporters from their annual meetings. Maurice Dockrell, the chairman of the latter, 
used to personally bring me out a glass of sherry after the meeting and graciously 
inform me that all resolutions had been carried without dissent. 
 
From then on, media coverage of finance expanded considerably. Business and Finance 
magazine was first published in 1964 and Hibernia was reinvented in 1968 as a magazine 
with an editorial blend of politics, gossip and business journalism. After it ceased 
publication in 1980, it was succeeded in 1983 by The Phoenix, which also featured 
substantive business coverage. The Irish Times and the Irish Independent had weekly 
business supplements by the mid-1980s and The Sunday Business Post was founded in 
1989 and remains the country’s only dedicated financial newspaper.  
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Yet tensions remained between business journalism and its source community. The 
Central Bank, for example, was contemptuous of reporters. George Lee, who worked 
there as an economist early in his career, described how the ‘prevailing view was that 
journalists are not all that bright, never understand what they are told, will twist things to 
get a story, and should never be trusted.’ Lee noted that RTÉ was first allowed to bring 
television cameras into Central Bank press conferences in 2001 – on the condition that 
the microphones were switched off, so as to prevent the broadcast of a potentially 
unguarded comment by an official (Lee, 2002, 68–9). 
 
Brokers had a similar attitude towards the media. Martin FitzGerald, former group 
business editor of Independent Newspapers, recalled that in the 1980s an attitude existed 
among senior financial figures that they owned the financial pages. He recalled being at a 
lunch to mark the appointment of a new president of the Irish Stock Exchange when 
journalists and brokers began discussing the mutual dependence between reporters and 
sources: 
 
‘What do you mean, mutual?’ a rubicund and slightly tipsy broker ventured. ‘The 
business pages are ours. We own them,’ he added . . . Trudging back to the office, 
however, I admit an icy feeling was coursing through my veins. Maybe, the chap 
with the English public school accent was right. He was implying that we were 
lazy, dependent and largely uncritical. More chillingly still, maybe our employers 
(who shared the same gentlemen’s clubs with the brokers) were happy with such 
an arrangement (Bourke, 2008, 61–4). 
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FitzGerald’s reflections highlight two connected, fundamental tensions within financial 
journalism about its role and its audience. While journalism traditionally operates on the 
principle that it acts as a watchdog over the powerful in society, interpreting elite opinion 
for broad audiences, business journalism operates differently. The modern financial press 
has focused not on broad audiences but on the opinions and values of a narrow elite that 
reads the business papers. And business journalists themselves do not agree about their 
primary audience and their central role as reporters. For example, one journalist stated 
that he operated as a watchdog that held power to account. His job, he said, was ‘holding 
business people and organisations to account and explaining complex events to people 
who are not experts in the field.’ But another journalist expressed the widespread view 
that his job was to provide specialised market information to investors: ‘the financial 
journalist is not paid to consider the wider consequences of commercial decisions, so 
hence the financial journalist has to be able to zone in on the strict commercial merits of 
big decisions.’ As media critic Dean Starkman (2012, 26) observed in his analysis of pre-
crash US business news, disagreements ‘over what business news actually is has never 
been resolved within newsrooms, or even properly articulated.’ 
 
These different conceptions can depend on the target audience of the news organisation. 
Business reporters who work for the Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, Business and 
Finance and the news agencies Bloomberg and Reuters produce content aimed at highly 
financially literate audiences. Journalists who report on finance for outlets aimed at broad 
audiences, such as the Irish Times, the Irish Independent and RTÉ news, produce 
business and economics as part of their overall coverage of current affairs and frequently 
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aim content at non-specialist audiences. But as Starkman (26) noted, these two audiences 
– investors and the public – need different newsgathering approaches. Reporting for 
broad audiences requires ‘an accountability orientation – a frame broad enough to take in 
social and external costs, as well as the time and space to lay out a case.’ But serving 
investors requires speed, access and ‘a focus on internal metrics like earnings.’ This 
tension is not always articulated or understood in criticisms of business news. Yet the 
result, Starkman (28) noted, was that ‘the interests of investors, even small ones, should 
not be confused with the public interest, which is much larger and, by definition, more 
important. Business-news organisations often conflate these missions, leading to 
significant conceptual confusion.’ Expecting systemic criticisms from reporters who do 
not see that style of reporting as their job is therefore unrealistic. 
 
The second feature alluded to by FitzGerald is shared by all financial journalists: a 
reliance on a core set of sources. Business news is tied to the consistent daily stream of 
routine, market-focused corporate and government announcements. The majority of 
business news comes from regular sources, such as company results and announcements, 
bank announcements, regulatory business, consultants’ reports, analysts’ reports, brokers, 
economists, company spokespeople and interviews with senior executives. The heads of 
public companies must communicate regularly with investors, brokers, pension managers 
and fund managers. They do this frequently through media conferences, timed to occur as 
company results are announced to the stock market. The information relayed from these 
sources is usually crafted to appeal to specialists in finance, not general readers. As Matt 
Cooper (2009, 207–8), a long-time business reporter, observed:   
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Unfortunately, these interviews are sometimes of little use to the radio listener or 
newspaper reader. The business leaders often lapse into jargon, sometimes 
deliberately, sometimes out of habit. They use terms familiar to their ilk but that 
confuse the general audience. They prefer to deal in specifics about their own 
company and talk in generalities about the economy – usually to condemn high 
costs, lack of competitiveness and excessive pay (for workers, not management). 
They also tend to steer away from criticism of, and confrontation with, the 
government or other authorities in the state . . .  
 
This proximity to, and dependence on, a restricted range of sources presents difficulties 
for the journalistic critique of business and, as a consequence, the public understanding of 
finance. Not only do the core sources for financial news have a strong motivation to 
shape the news in a way that presents their organisation in the best light, but these same 
sources are also often the only sources of information for financial journalists. Moreover, 
the sources that provide expert commentary on financial news, such as economists and 
market analysts, are employed by banks and stockbrokers. As a result of this closeness to 
a set of sources, brokers and investors who supplied information to journalists become 
definers of that information. The audience and source for financial news is often the same 
set of people. Financial journalism is produced with information from figures in the 
business community for the business community.  
 
For the media sociologist Aeron Davis (2000, 285), this process harms democracy. His 
study of the production of financial journalism in the City of London, its financial sector, 
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found that business news was produced and consumed in closed communication 
networks. Journalists moved in small circles that consisted almost exclusively of financial 
figures. For Davis, this flow of newsworthy information was not an example of elite to 
mass communication, as traditionally practiced by journalists, but an example of elite-
elite communication. That is, elites were at once the major sources, targets and recipients 
of financial news. Excluded and absent from these networks were ‘the mass of consumer-
citizens [who] can be no more than ill-informed spectators.’ 
 
A feature of this closed elite-elite network is that business reporters must navigate an 
expanded layer of strategic communication professionals who aim to control the flow of 
information between companies and journalists. In Ireland, the amount of public relations 
professionals has also grown and, between 1993 and 2003, public relations expertise has 
become a core part of the management of Ireland’s top 300 companies (O’Dwyer, 2005). 
Companies employ these professionals because public image contributes to corporate 
reputation and revenue. During interviews that I have conducted, financial journalists 
noted that one of the ways that these communication specialists seek to influence the 
content of financial news is to cultivate favourable relationships with some journalists 
while simultaneously excluding other journalists from the elite-elite communication 
network. One journalist observed: ‘it was well known that some PR companies try to 
bully journalists by cutting off access or excluding journalists from briefings.’ Yet 
reporters must maintain good relations with this set of core sources to access information. 
Another journalist noted that ‘reporters operate within that system and within [or] on the 
fringes or certain circles of knowledge. If they are overly critical of those within those 
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circles, they can lose out on access to that knowledge and therefore they lose stories.’ An 
‘exchange relationship’ exists whereby journalists get stories and companies get 
publicity, but this sets the conditions for less sustained critical reporting. One journalist 
noted this was evident in the boom years: reporters were ‘reluctant to be critical of 
companies because they fear they will not get information or access in the future.’ 
Another journalist stated that this support was ‘justified editorially because many 
developers and bankers limited access to such an extent that it became seen to be better to 
write soft stories about them than to lose access.’ 
 
Celtic Tiger journalism: herding and groupthink?  
Journalists, who cite independence and detachment as professional values, are reluctant 
to acknowledge that they are embedded within such elite-elite networks. When asked 
whether they operated within these elite-elite networks during the boom years, no 
consensus emerged. Yet they stated that their sources came from the business 
community, which formed a large part of their audience. More generally, such a closed 
network is a feature of the relationship between elites in Ireland. Former finance minister 
Brian Lenihan stated that the crisis in corporate governance was influenced by ‘too many 
incestuous relationships’, which the Financial Times interpreted as a small pool of people 
willing to take up non-executive roles in companies (Grant and Murray Brown, 2010, 
14).  
 
As well as operating within elite networks, some journalists during the boom years 
operated within the same intellectual framework as these political and economic elites –
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elites that pushed the message that regulation in any form was bad for business. In 2007 
one prominent banker described the lax regulatory regime as ‘corporate McCarthyism’, a 
comment that prompted little or no journalistic comment (Madden, 2007). Some 
journalists believed in the historical liberal economic view that financial markets were 
efficient, stable and self-correcting. According to a government-issued report by Peter 
Nyberg, a former International Monetary Fund economist, this points to the role that an 
uncritical media played in the systemic financial crisis. Before such crises, the media 
were, he wrote, ‘generally supportive of corporate and bank expansion, profit growth and 
risk taking, while being dismissive of warnings of unsustainable developments.’ The 
media, Nyberg added, had a fairly ‘large influence on how pre-crisis developments were 
perceived, discussed and acted upon’ (Nyberg, 2011, 5–6).   
 
Nyberg is describing here the media’s agenda setting function. At its simplest, this 
influential theory of media effects explains the process of the media presenting some 
issues often and prominently with the result that large segments of the public come to 
perceive those issues as more important than others. The tone of the coverage, 
furthermore, is the tone that will be foremost in the public mind when considering the 
issue. Communications researchers have demonstrated that the news media do have a 
degree of influence on how people view the economy (Hester and Gibson, 2003). Having 
looked at how the media covered the boom, Cooper (2009, 36) concluded that the 
pervasive media tone was that of ‘wealth and consumption’, while Carswell (2011, 31) 
found that the ‘media enthusiastically supported the Irish preoccupation with property 
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ownership and supported the profit growth at the banks while generally dismissing 
warnings that the property market was growing out of control.’ 
Due to their reliance on a core set of sources, business journalists found it difficult to find 
a range of dissenting views to this prevalent mood. Their sources, essentially, were all 
saying the same thing. Nyberg noted that ‘herding’ was prevalent within the banks: 
institutions uncritically followed each other’s practices. Within institutions, ‘groupthink’ 
dominated; there existed little or no considerations of alternative positions or little critical 
analysis (Nyberg, 2011, 7). In communication terms, a spiral of silence – whereby people 
fear the isolation or exclusion that would result from speaking publicly against a 
perceived dominant view – appeared to operate within financial institutions. Warnings 
were dismissed as wrong. Staff members were afraid that their status or reputations 
would suffer if they argued a contrary view. Doubters stayed silent to avoid sanction or 
isolation. The oppositional viewpoints that were expressed came from what Nyberg 
(2011, iii) called ‘a handful of identified vociferous contrarians.’ 
 
Similarly, financial regulators did not provide consistent dissent. As Carswell (2011, 74) 
found, the Irish Financial Regulator was ‘under-resourced and out of its depth’ as it had 
just three people supervising Anglo Irish Bank in 2005; the same three people who were 
responsible for monitoring the Bank of Ireland. International regulators, like domestic 
regulators, were also surprised at the fragility of Irish banks, which had similar risk 
management practices to British and European banks, even though Ireland’s lending was 
apparently more reckless. As a result, there was conformity and consensus in 
assessments, and reporters did not have a variety of views to reflect. Conor Brady (2010) 
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noted that the dissent that was printed or broadcast came mainly from academic 
economists and commentators. Newspaper columnists are expected to provide a counter 
view, as part of their professional role is to provide an alternative, sometimes contrarian, 
voice on current affairs (Fahy, 2009). But during the boom years, their voices and those 
of other experts were marginalised. They were, in Carswell’s words, ‘dismissed and 
ridiculed as cranks’ (Carswell, 2011, 72). This pattern of marginalisation is typical of a 
country in the grip of what economist J.K. Galbraith (1990) termed financial euphoria. 
He argued that those who spoke out at a time of collective exhilaration are ‘the exception 
to a very broad and binding rule’ where personal interest, public pressure and ‘seemingly 
superior financial opinion’ conspire to sustain this euphoric belief. 
 
For example, in 2004 journalist and former banker Michael Murray noted in a column in 
the Sunday Business Post that Anglo Irish Bank was stuck on what he called ‘an 
unenviable and dangerous treadmill’ of aggressive loans. Carswell (2011, 58–9) noted 
that this insight ‘proved to be prophetic, but at the time few were worried about the 
prospect of a slump. The other banks’ main concern was to try to keep up with Anglo’.  
As Carswell (119) noted, a senior official at Anglo Irish Bank often personally chastised 
bank analysts or financial reporters or commentators who criticised the bank. As one 
business journalist put it, his peers operated self-censorship in such a climate of opinion: 
 
For the most part they [journalists] were not critical enough and even those that 
were in private conversation didn’t express those views in their stories. There 
204 
 
were some reporters who did criticise policies, but they were in a minority and no 
matter how vocal they were, there is an argument that no one wanted to hear it.  
 
The economic interest of some commentators contributed also to the process of 
marginalisation. Writing about why so few mainstream economists came to the defence 
of Morgan O’Kelly – who is, it must be noted, a specialist in medieval populations – after 
his Irish Times opinion articles were harshly criticised, O’Toole (2009, 125) noted that 
the vast majority of Irish economists gave ‘timid and carefully couched murmurs of 
unease.’ He argued that those economists that dominated media discussion were usually 
employed by financial institutions and had a strong motivation for their predictions that 
the economy would not suddenly collapse. Likewise, Shane Ross (2009) described a 
similar process (in a chapter titled ‘Poodles and Spoofers’) whereby economists who 
worked for banks and brokers helped inflate the property bubble and castigated critics. 
 
Political and financial figures were wary too, of the potential effects that negative media 
coverage could have on the economy. A study of economic headlines in the New York 
Times (Blood and Phillips, 1997, 107) found that increased numbers of unfavourable 
economic headlines in the paper dampened consumer sentiment. The study’s authors 
concluded that ‘the amount and tone of economic coverage exerted a powerful influence’ 
on the real economy. This may explain why, in 2006, one high-profile developer 
criticised those to whom he referred as the ‘the harbingers of doom and gloom’ in the 
media (McDonald and Sheridan, 2008, 268). It may also provide a conceptual base, at 
least, for government fears about talking down the economy, a trend articulated most 
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sharply when Taoiseach Bertie Ahern wondered why those predicting the worst for the 
economy did not ‘commit suicide’ (RTÉ, 2007). As recently as 2010 the then minister for 
finance, Brian Lenihan, called on journalists ‘to be aware of the self-fulfilling nature of 
doomsday scenarios’ because media coverage could ‘undermine or promote confidence 
in our economy’. Negative reports at home were, Lenihan declared, ‘beamed around the 
world and can influence the decisions of foreign investors and multinationals’ (Cullen, 
2010). This desire too is evident in the way political figures and economists predicted the 
property market would have a soft landing – that is, that the market would not suddenly 
collapse, but would experience a gradual fall that would not be a shock to mortgage 
holders. Cooper (2009, 303) argued that the idea of a soft landing emerged as a ‘rebuff to 
a number of economists and commentators, such as David McWilliams, George Lee, 
Alan Ahearne, Morgan Kelly, Richard Curran and Brendan Keenan’ who warned of 
Ireland’s weakening competitiveness and property bubble inflation. 
 
Furthermore, the dominant political party during the boom years, Fianna Fáil, engaged in 
auction politics. At the party’s 2007 ard fheis, then Taoiseach Bertie Ahern – amid 
increasing political pressure over revelations about his personal financial dealings more 
than a decade earlier – promised free health screenings, pension increases, more teachers 
and gardaí, as well as €4.2 billion of tax cuts if his party was returned for a third term in 
power (McGee and O’Brien, 2007). And as Stafford (2011, 345) noted, the government’s 
budgetary policy in the economic boom can be ‘summarised in the apocryphal comment 
by Ahern’s one-time finance minister Charlie McCreevy on his budgetary policy: ‘When 
I have it, I spend it. When I don’t, I don’t.’  McCreevy’s view was representative of a 
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central message of governmental political communication during the boom years that was 
framed around the advocacy and defence of its liberal economic policies. In another 
example, McCreevy in a 2005 speech to the financial regulator, after a series of scandals 
in financial services, said: ‘My political philosophy is based on giving people freedom. 
That includes freedom to make money and to lose it.’ He classed himself as one of ‘the 
‘unregulated generation’ – the generation that has produced some of the best risk takers, 
problem solvers, and inventors’ (cited in O’Toole, 2009, 147). For international 
audiences, the message communicated was that of Ireland as a model for rapid economic 
development, a message that resonated ‘because the globalised Irish economy had itself 
become a global brand’ (O’Toole, 2009, 8). 
 
In addition to these influences on their reporting, during the boom, financial journalists 
also faced practical constraints on their daily journalism. For instance, they were, and 
remain, constrained by stock market regulations concerning the public disclosure of 
market-sensitive information that affects share prices. Also, strict laws on defamation not 
only restrict what can be reported, but can be used to deter journalistic investigation. 
Financial reporters work each day under the threat of legal action from well-funded 
companies and individuals that could afford extraordinarily expensive litigation. One 
journalist noted that many legal actions by wealthy individuals or companies are 
‘executed purely to stifle genuine inquiry.’ Commercial information is routinely denied to 
financial journalists. Public companies must communicate, but private organisations are 
not legally required to reveal their financial performance. Cooper (2009) noted that 
during the boom years, there was a trend for businesses towards unlimited liability status, 
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a move that meant owners were liable for losses, but also meant companies avoided 
public scrutiny of their accounts. This move to private status often occurred before a 
public company was sold. Furthermore, some of the structural weaknesses of Irish banks 
were not publicly disclosed. Anglo Irish Bank made a series of bad loans to developers 
who continued to be optimistic about the future of the property bubble. For instance, the 
developer Seán Quinn was able to amass a huge equity stake in Anglo – almost 30% 
funded through speculation – without being legally obligated to disclose it publicly.   
 
News organisations themselves benefited from the increased advertising revenue during 
the boom. In the course of interviews that I conducted, journalists noted that the reliance 
of some media outlets on real estate advertising, in particular, contributed to a lack of 
critical coverage of property. For example, one financial journalist observed: ‘much of 
the mainstream media seems to me to be very conflicted because of their reliance on real 
estate and recruitment advertising. That doesn’t mean reporters consciously avoid writing 
bad news stories, but it’s hard to run against the tide when everyone is getting rich.’ The 
importance of property advertising to media organisations was illustrated in 2006 when 
the Irish Times paid €50 million for the property website myhome.ie, established in 2001 
by estate agents Sherry FitzGerald, the Gunne Group and Douglas Newman Good. A 
study of that newspaper’s housing and property pages in the months before the 2007 
general election found that coverage was biased in its selection of sources, which came 
predominantly from the mortgage, real estate, building and banking industries. Moreover, 
housing and property was reported uncritically in the paper. For example, of the 60 
articles included in the study’s total sample that described residential properties and the 
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19 that referred to commercial properties, ‘not one (this at the height of the Irish bubble) 
considered the possibility the properties might have been overvalued.’ The paper’s news 
section covered corruption among politicians and property developers. But the study 
found that no ‘articles concerning corruption in property appeared in the property or 
business sections’ and argued that structural problems, such as the overproduction of 
houses, rising prices of property and land and the zoning of land, were ignored (Preston 
and Silke, 2011, 60).  
 
In this context, no consensus emerged in the interviews that I conducted about whether or 
not the journalists judged their own and their peers’ journalism to be sufficiently critical 
of financial institutions’ practices and government policy in the boom years. One 
journalist stated that he and his colleagues ‘constantly questioned the sustainability of the 
Celtic Tiger economy, but it was not always given the proper foregrounding.’ He also 
noted that there were few ‘outside forces suggesting the problem was as big as it later 
became.’ Those engaged in critical news analysis were marginalised according to another 
journalist: ‘The problems that we have seen in Irish financial journalism in recent years 
have been due largely to its unquestioning support for the elite consensus’ he said. ‘For 
instance, during the property boom, journalists shouldn’t have been just reporting what 
the developers said, they should have been asking ‘where’s the demand for all these 
houses?’ and how do you propose servicing your debt?’ 
 
As the crisis escalated, marginalised voiced became mainstream. The spate of books on 
the crisis wrapped the systemic failures in Ireland and internationally inside compelling 
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narratives. Economics was a bestseller and economists became celebrities. Reviewing 
Cooper’s Who really runs Ireland? author and commentator Eamon Delaney (2009) 
argued that these types of book were a welcome counterpoint to the ‘simplistic shorthand 
[that has] emerged whereby the bankers and developers have brought the whole economy 
down.’ And, as recounted by some of the interviewees, financial journalism has also 
changed. As one journalist put it, ‘reporters have become much quicker to question 
figures presented by either government or companies and to ask whether the information 
has been independently audited as accurate.’ Another noted that coverage has ‘became 
more critical, more investigative and more sceptical.’ Journalists, he believed, have 
developed ‘a healthy scepticism’ towards the business community. Yet, Irish print news 
media in the first two years of the economic crisis, from 2008 to 2010, examined the 
crash not as a complex set of inter-connected developments, but as a conflict between the 
public and private sectors (Cawley, 2011). 
 
A systemic, networked and curatorial financial journalism 
The lack of sustained critical coverage in the boom years and before the economic crash 
was not due to a single factor or force. It cannot be explained by a simplistic argument 
that business reporters somehow neglected their assumed role. Instead, a fully developed 
explanation points to collection of forces that influenced the production of a dominant 
type of financial journalism that neglected sustained systemic analysis and marginalised 
alternative voices. These factors were the specialism’s unresolved split conception of its 
audiences, its reliance on a closed set of agenda-driven routine sources and expert 
commentators, the nature of routine information gathering and its marginalisation of 
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dissent. These factors largely encouraged fragmentation of coverage and prevented 
systemic critique. Sustained and critical Irish financial journalism did not occur until the 
recession had reached its most devastating phase. After that, journalists adopted a much 
more critical tone, as the culture-wide importance of financial news was enhanced in 
post-bailout Ireland.  
 
The unprecedented scale of the crisis indicates that weaknesses in reporting will contain 
critical lessons for future financial journalism, and for the public understanding of 
economics. Anthropologist David Graeber (2011, 15) has argued that the crash had the 
potential, among advanced industrial countries, to begin ‘an actual public conversation 
about the nature of debt, of money, of the financial institutions that have come to hold the 
fate of nations in their grip.’ While he observed that this conversation did not occur, it has 
the potential to do so within the journalism genres of commentary and analysis, which are 
becoming increasingly important, even as more and more services are providing up-to-the 
second financial information. These genres could feature the type of holistic business 
journalism articulated by Financial Times journalist Gillian Tett in the epilogue to her 
book Fool’s Gold (2009). This reporting would, according to Tett, make explicit the 
sometimes hidden connections in the global financial system, connections between the 
macroeconomic system, the practices of individual banks, the actions of individuals 
within those banks, and the impacts on the consumers of financial products. 
 
Fool’s Gold is an exemplar of the future practice that she advocates. It examined the 
creation of a form of derivatives by a group within J.P. Morgan that, as it spread through 
211 
 
the system, was a catalyst in the crash. The book analysed the bankers, their personalities, 
the system in which they worked and the global system that took their financial 
innovation and corrupted it. Tett drew on her own training as a social anthropologist – a 
background that she tells was derided by one banker as too “hippie” – to tie these strands 
together in a compelling explanatory narrative.  
 
This style of reporting is not restricted to books or long magazine articles. New ways of 
reporting individual stories can overcome some of the constraints faced by financial 
journalists. The respected analysts of American journalism Bill Kovach and Tom 
Rosenstiel (2011, 65-73) propose two types of storytelling that allow for big-picture 
analysis. ‘Sense-making news’ adds new information that gives greater meaning to other 
news and facts while ‘New paradigm reporting’ establishes new understandings about 
broader phenomena, understandings that often challenge conventional wisdom.  Both 
story genres aim towards holistic analysis. Moreover, journalists in the digital era must be 
curators of information. They must be proficient in evaluating multiple perspectives on 
an issue and be able to highlight for their audiences the most important details and 
interpretations from a mass of information on a topic. Seeking out and presenting a range 
of perspectives on a financial or political topic can lead to richer storytelling. 
 
Journalists are no longer the only ones who can tell these stories. The digital space in 
which much communication now occurs allows for more participatory forms of 
journalism. An example of a nascent form of what has been called networked journalism 
was evident in the communications work of the ‘Budgetjam project’, organised after the 
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bailout of Ireland and before the implementation of austerity measures (Titley, 2013). 
This network of political and community activists, journalists and academics produced 
material that contributed to public debate. Its work aimed to challenge the dominant 
interpretation, as the network saw it, by policymakers and mainstream journalists that 
strict austerity measures were needed. The network collated alternative budget 
calculations, conducted assessments of the social cost of budget measures and provided 
alternative economic interpretations of financial data to that provided by the IMF. It 
disseminated this evidence and analysis through social media and into newspaper 
material and broadcast appearances. It was a form of networked journalism in that 
audiences were no longer just sources and targets for journalism, but actively produced 
information that mixes and intersects with mainstream journalism content, providing 
richer and deeper public affairs journalism. 
 
As Ireland’s austerity measures grind on, these forms of journalism can help overcome 
the myriad factors that blunted critical business coverage in the boom years. These forms 
have the potential to break the elite-elite communication networks, propose perspectives 
from alternative sources that can become part of the media agenda, and prevent coverage 
being corralled into traditional story structures that emphasise conflict and crude binary 
oppositions. The ultimate aim of this journalism is to explain and interpret the globally 
interconnected financial processes that impact on the lives of Irish citizens. This 
accountability-orientated business journalism will focus less on fragmentary coverage 
and more on the more difficult journalistic task of telling comprehensible narratives that 
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helps citizens understand the often obscured nature of the systemic global problems that 
shape their lives. 
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